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ABSTRACT
The literature on external voting overlooks why some political
parties campaign abroad while others remain focused on the
national territory. This article investigates the determinants of the
strategic entry of political parties in overseas districts through
analysing legislative elections in Ecuador (2007–2017). Based on a
study of the incentives and constraints of political party presence
abroad, we find that parties are more likely to compete for
elections in overseas districts displaying a weaker party
competition as well as when they account for previous electoral
experience in these districts.
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Although external voting rights usually demonstrate a relatively low impact on homeland
politics, the political engagement of non-resident citizens can drive political parties to
campaign and create branches abroad, as well as recruit party members and activists
in overseas districts (Burgess, 2018; Levitt & De la Dehesa, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen
& Ciornei, 2019b; Portes, Escobar, & Radford, 2007). In New Zealand, for instance,
the Green Party launched an online campaign ‘Hey Kiwi’ to attract support from New
Zealanders living abroad in the 2011 elections (Gamlen, 2015). Likewise, the demo-
cratic-liberal and liberal parties in Romania have been favoured by diaspora voting
since the 2009 presidential elections (Burean, 2011).
Bearing in mind ever-increasing human mobility, scholars have examined a set of
explanatory factors to reveal why countries enact, regulate and apply emigrant enfranch-
isement (e.g. Palop-García & Pedroza, 2019; Rhodes & Harutyunyan, 2010; Turcu &
Urbatsch, 2015; Umpierrez de Reguero, Yener-Roderburg, & Cartagena, 2021;
Wellman, 2020). Similarly, existing literature has delved in the political consequences
of external voting on homeland politics (e.g. Bauböck, 2006; Collyer, 2014b; Lafleur,
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2013). These contributions have come mainly from the field of migration studies.
Research on party politics has traditionally focused on the national arena, overlooking
other spaces of party competition, such as the transnational arena (similar claims have
been made by, e.g. Burgess & Tyburski, 2020; Jakobson, Saarts, & Kalev, 2020; Kernale-
genn & van Haute, 2020), despite a subset of countries with overseas districts that allow
parties to selectively compete in them. In this context, our research question deals with
political parties’ strategic entry in overseas districts,1 and more precisely on the reasons
why do some parties compete to capture overseas votes, while others remain focussed on
the national territory.
To answer this question, we analyse the electoral performance and political trajectory
of political parties in overseas districts. Following Gamlen’s (2015) contribution, the
main assumption of this article relies on the feedback effect, i.e. the perceived importance
of external voting rights for parties to engage overseas voters. Political parties are particu-
larly careful when referring to overseas districts, given their high campaigning cost, geo-
graphical distance, incomplete information and specific characteristics of emigration
waves (Østergaard-Nielsen & Ciornei, 2019b; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2020; van Haute & Ker-
nalegenn, 2020). Different groups of individuals in a given district (whether inside or
outside national borders) have different preferences and vary in their electoral behaviour
patterns (see Peltoniemi, 2016b; Potter & Olivella, 2015; Wellman, 2020). Consequently,
we expect that if the electoral rules do not constrain them, parties will vary in their
pattern of electoral competition when formulating strategies to obtain overseas voters,
as compared to inland electoral districts.
In this article, we evaluate this argument by analysing the case of Ecuador. This
country is characterised by state-led transnationalism, using an electoral system
based on proportional representation, including three two-seats overseas districts. It
has a highly-fragmented party system. The enfranchisement of Ecuadorians living
abroad was promulgated in 1998 and implemented for the first time in 2006 in presi-
dential elections. Since then, non-resident Ecuadorians have gone 11 times to voting
booths to participate in six different types of elections, including direct democracy
tools. Overall, Ecuador is the leading example of transnational party competition in
Latin America and the Caribbean via materialising political offices abroad, campaign-
ing abroad and recruiting (non-resident citizen) party members (Pedroza & Palop-
García, 2017). By employing a dataset based on all Ecuadorian parties that compete
in overseas districts, we focus on the factors explaining transnational party
competition.
In what follows, we briefly review prior analyses of parties’ strategic entry in overseas
electoral districts. This theoretical discussion helps us formulate our hypotheses. In the
third section, we present the data and method of analysis. In the fourth section, we
descriptively analyse the dependent and independent variables, as well as discuss our
regression models. We conclude with a novel proposal to measure the feedback
effect in overseas districts. Our study contributes to the existing literature (e.g.
Gamlen, 2015) that, until now, has lacked aggregate data to create an inferential
model of political trajectories and parties’ electoral performance in the transnational
arena, including in what Collyer (2014a) has coined as a ‘vote abroad for direct
representation’.2
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Theory and Hypotheses
In many countries, political parties can choose to participate in elections at two different
levels: nationwide or district-based (or both). Often, parties do not compete in all dis-
tricts in a given election but rather selectively enter a subset of districts for different
reasons, given limited resources, new electoral niches or broader patterns of electoral
competition (Blais, Lachat, Hino, & Doray-Demers, 2011; Morgenstern & Vasquez-
D’Elia, 2007). Accordingly, a growing number of contributions seek to explain parties’
decisions, particularly their strategic electoral entry from a district, rather than national,
perspective (e.g. Burgess, 2018; Kernalegenn & van Haute, 2020; Østergaard-Nielsen &
Ciornei, 2019b; Potter & Olivella, 2015; Selb & Pituctin, 2010). Some accounts have
suggested a blend of explanatory factors that drive some parties to be present nationwide,
while others only participate in a subset of electoral districts (Cox, 1997; Duverger, 1954/
2001; Taagepera & Shugart, 1993). This is the case for full emigrant parties (FEP) in
Ecuador (Umpierrez de Reguero & Dandoy, 2020), the Philippines (Burgess, 2018)
and Italy (van Haute & Kernalegenn, 2020). Created from abroad by groups of emigrants,
these FEP often compete in national politics by participating in elections only in one or
more overseas districts.
For Collyer (2014a), three types of electoral systems exist in which a country can apply
emigrant enfranchisement: (1) vote in the home district, or the provision where non-resi-
dent citizens return to their home country on election day to exercise suffrage rights (e.g.
Israel and Uruguay), otherwise they cannot vote; (2) vote abroad for the home district,
where votes are casted abroad but counted among the total pool of votes in the last dis-
trict of residence prior to emigration (e.g. Turkey and Spain) or by default in the main
district in the home country (e.g. Warsaw in Poland); and (3) vote abroad for direct rep-
resentation, in which emigrants cannot only vote but may also stand as candidates in an
overseas district. Although voting for the home district is frequently discarded given the
spatial limitations, some scholars take this provision into account (e.g. Hutcheson &
Arrighi, 2015). With this system of voting abroad for direct representation, political
parties can compete to win between one (in Colombia) and 18 overseas seats (in
Tunisia) (Collyer, 2014b). Correspondingly, this provision offers greater incentives for
party competition, even in cases with general representation of emigrants (e.g. Peru).
In the case of voting abroad for a home district within an electoral system of pro-
portional representation, overseas votes can increase the overall (national) vote share
of any party competing. In a plurality-majority system, overseas votes only serve for
the winning party in that given district (Østergaard-Nielsen & Ciornei, 2019b). As
such, overseas districts can have a larger impact in proportional representation settings.
To some extent, the provision of the vote abroad for direct representation is analogous to
a candidate-based FPTP system where the winner takes all in each district – except in
Italy, which has a proportional design for external voting (Collyer, 2014b). However,
and independent from the chosen electoral system, voting abroad for direct represen-
tation is different than the other types of external voting provisions since it provides
additional incentives for political parties to compete.
The literature on political competition incorporates another set of factors that explain
political parties’ decisions to participate in elections. Parties could perceive an incentive
to increase activities in districts where the election result is expected to be close (Blais,
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2000; Geys, 2006). These incentives are further remarkable in elections when the aggre-
gate homeland result is subject to change by the influence of overseas votes, such as when
only a few seats have the potential to disrupt the equilibrium between mainstream and
emergent parties in terms of coalitions formation (Gamlen, 2015).
The capacity to swing the overall results or alter the coalition formation bargaining is
more likely to occur when the size of the overseas districts is proportionally smaller than
other electoral districts within the home country. In Ecuador, for instance, the 152,180
non-resident Ecuadorians registered to vote in the 2007 elections represented only
1.6% of the total electorate but were granted no less than 4.6% of the seats. Logically,
it takes fewer votes for a party to win seats in the overseas districts than in the home dis-
tricts. This is further exacerbated by the fact that turnout is generally much lower in over-
seas districts as compared to home districts (Lafleur, 2013), especially in countries where
voting is compulsory in inland electoral districts but facultative abroad, such as in
Ecuador. In 2007, turnout was 26.1% abroad versus 74% in home districts. As a result,
the 39,698 overseas voters that turned out represented 0.58% of the total electorate,
yet occupied 4.6% of the seats in the National Assembly of Ecuador (Ramírez & Umpier-
rez de Reguero, 2019). Thereby, the institutional features of external voting, such as the
district magnitude and the size of the district, represent important aspects in parties’ stra-
tegic calculus.
Our first set of hypotheses concerns the patterns of party competition. The decision to
participate in an election often results from a cost–benefit calculation. Similar to the
argument regarding the capacity of swinging electoral results, a political party might
decide to partake in elections only in cases where the probability of gaining a seat is
not equal to zero. This decision might be affected by the number of parties participating
in the elections in the electoral district: the larger the number of parties, the lower the
incentive to participate in the election. But a small number of parties competing in a
given election does not necessarily mean that it is easier to win a seat in this district. Fre-
quently, low party competition is explained by the fact that one party (often the incum-
bent) dominates the electoral district. Consequently, we expect that: (H1a) parties are
more likely to compete in overseas districts that display low party competition, combined
with the expectation that (H1b) parties are more likely to compete in overseas districts
where there is no dominant party.
Previous electoral success often triggers incentives for parties to participate in elec-
tions in a given electoral district. Obtaining a seat, or being close to winning the elec-
tions, are two of the significant pathways to improve a party’s media coverage and
visibility among the electorate (Potter & Olivella, 2015). Similarly, parties look at
their electoral performance in previous elections in the same district as a proxy to cal-
culate their probabilities of electoral success; thereafter, they use the probabilities to
decide to participate, or not. Following these arguments, we expect that: (H2) political
parties with previous electoral experience in overseas districts are more likely to compete
in overseas districts.
The third hypothesis concerns the characteristics of the overseas districts. Electoral
districts are seldom perfectly equal and might display different socio-demographics. In
this regard, size (in terms of number of population or registered voters) is probably
the most important district-related factor that might affect a party’s decision to
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compete in elections. Following our arguments above, and given district magnitude
remains constant across districts, it may be easier to win seats in a district with a
small population of voters. We therefore expect that: (H3a) political parties are more
likely to compete in smaller overseas districts.
Compared to home districts, overseas districts often cut across international borders
and a district rarely fits perfectly into an existent country (since migrants are unequally
distributed across countries). Overseas districts tend to cover groups of migrants living in
different countries or even on different continents. It seems de facto more difficult for a
party to mobilise voters and campaign staff in an electoral district distributed over 20
different countries, as compared to a district limited to the migrant population of only
one country. As a result, we expect that: (H3b) political parties are more likely to
compete in overseas districts that cover few countries.
Party ideology may also have an impact on a party’s decision to compete in overseas
districts. In Europe, MPs pay special attention to emigrant-related issues, not only when
their party captures overseas votes, but also when election results among non-resident
citizens had been close in previous elections (Østergaard-Nielsen & Ciornei, 2019a).
Likewise, emigrant-related issues are prominent in Latin American legislatures that
apply emigrant special representation, such as Colombia and Ecuador, suggesting that
the impact of emigrant-reserved seats significantly correlates with the overseas district
size (Palop-García, 2018).
Political parties can support external voting rights in parliamentary debates and they
may include it in their ideology and political campaigns (Burgess, 2018; Paarlberg, 2019).
Parties’ positions on emigrant-related issues might be a determinant for a political party
to compete in overseas districts. The way they mention these issues, as well as the way
they stand for non-resident citizens in parliament, can equate to (dis)engagement with
the emigrant electorate niche. If a party advocates migrant enfranchisement in parlia-
ment, whether non-resident citizens’ or foreign residents’ voting rights, these groups
will be more likely to vote in the upcoming elections for that party (see the Enfranchise-
ment-Gratitude Model in Turcu & Urbatsch, 2020). If a party explicitly includes emi-
grant-related issues in its party manifestos, it is indirectly inviting non-resident
citizens to vote for it and even join as party members and activists. Otherwise, if the
party does not mention emigrant-related issues or portrays a negative perception of
migrants, it means that the party is uninterested in capturing overseas votes. Accordingly,
we expect that: (H4a) parties displaying an ideology favourable to emigrants are more likely
to compete in overseas districts.
Prior contributions suggest that party position on the left-right scale is significantly
associated with emigrant-related issues. According to Østergaard-Nielsen, Ciornei,
and Lafleur (2019), moderate right-wing parties are more likely to support external
voting rights in Europe. In Latin America, party ideology tends to behave differently.
Although right-leaning ‘strongmen’ led migrant enfranchisement processes prior to
the 1990s, over the last three decades left-wing parties have extended voting rights
to non-resident nationals and noncitizen residents (Escobar, 2015; Finn, 2020),
mostly by combining the promotion of electoral participation with populism. In
this way, we expect that: (H4b) left-wing parties are more likely to compete in overseas
districts.
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Ecuadorian Elections, Data and Variables
In order to evaluate the presence of political parties in Ecuadorian overseas districts, we
build a dataset that comprises all four legislative elections, where non-resident Ecuador-
ians could vote: the 2007 Constituent Assembly elections and the elections of 2009, 2013
and 2017 at both district-based and nationwide levels.
Data is collected at the party level, clustered in each of the three overseas electoral dis-
tricts. Overseas districts are divided based on geographic groups of countries: (1) Europe,
Asia and Oceania; (2) Canada and the United States; and (3) Latin America, the Carib-
bean and Africa. Each district sends two representatives to the National Assembly, inde-
pendent from the number of registered voters in the district.
Even though there have been few changes in the Ecuadorian electoral system regard-
ing the external voting since 20073 (Umpierrez de Reguero & Dandoy, 2020), we assume
that it did not affect parties’ decisions to participate in elections. Except for the formula
for the conversion of votes into seats, the core elements of the Ecuadorian electoral
system for external voting – proportional representation, district magnitude, ballot struc-
ture and candidacy rights – remained the same over this period.
Emigrant representatives are elected for four-year terms (for a maximum of two terms
in the same type of seat) based on a proportional electoral system with open lists, allow-
ing panachage (voters can select two candidates belonging to two different party lists).
Given the low district magnitude of just two seats and the absence of substitute candi-
dates, party lists are composed of only two candidates in each district. Similar to
inland districts, the number of seats defines the maximum number of candidates per
party list. Independent candidates are not allowed. Since there are two seats in each of
the three overseas districts, a voter should select two candidates on the ballot, no
matter if they belong to the same party list or from two different parties. Likewise, the
order of the candidates is unimportant and voters can select two candidates on the
first row of the ballot, two candidates on the second row, or one on the first and
another on the second.
The first task in the database construction is establishing the political parties’ list. Since
we want to explain why some parties participate in legislative elections in overseas dis-
tricts while others choose not to enlist candidates for these elections, we cannot rely
on official party registration information. Consequently, in our database we include all
political parties that presented candidates in a given election at the national level and
all parties that presented candidates in a previous election in at least one overseas district
(given the party still exists). Altogether, we end up with 485 observations, which is the
number of parties that could have participated in elections in one of the three overseas
districts.
The dependent variable is based on the presence or absence of the political party on
the electoral ballot in an overseas district. Parties can decide to participate in legislative
elections in all overseas districts, in only one (or two) district or not to participate in the
legislative elections at all. We use the official registration documents from the National
Electoral Commission of Ecuador (CNE) in order to enlist all the political parties and
coalitions that competed in these elections and/or in the previous one and we
compare these observations with data on the party presence in home districts. The
dependent variable is therefore a binary measure that assesses whether the party
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participates in the legislative elections in a given election year and in a given overseas dis-
trict: (1) if the party decided to compete in the election and (0) if the party does not
partake in the election. Table 1 shows that only 27.22% of all Ecuadorians political
parties participated in at least one of the given overseas districts. In other words, it
means that more than three-fourths of all Ecuadorian parties that competed in the leg-
islative elections in home districts decided not to present candidates in the overseas dis-
tricts. In Ecuador, party organisations are free to compete in the number of districts they
want to, in the country, abroad or both.
A clear example lies in the case of the Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano,
PSC), one of the main Ecuadorian parties. In the 2007 and 2009 legislative elections, the
PSC decided to present candidates in two out of three overseas districts, but not in the
Latin America, Caribbean and Africa district. In 2007, the PSC even managed to obtain
the second largest vote share in the two overseas districts where it competed and it is
likely that the party could have received a decent amount of votes in the third district.
The fact thatmany established parties like the PSC decide not to compete in some electoral
districts is very surprising, as the logistical cost for participating in the overseas districts is
rather low: there is almost no administrative burden as the party is already registered with
the CNE at the national level and, given the small district magnitude, needs to find ‘only’
two candidates to fully participate in these elections. Still, campaigning abroad means
higher costs to political parties, compared to other small electoral districts within the
country, given the geographical distance of overseas districts and the additional con-
straints created by the residence country (Lafleur, 2013; Peltoniemi, 2016a).
Table 1 illustrates an important within-variation in the presence of Ecuadorian party
organisations in overseas districts. Given the highly unstable party system in Ecuador, the
number of political parties registered in the legislative elections varies significantly over
time as does, by definition, the number of parties presenting candidates in the overseas
districts. The lowest shares of parties participating in elections in overseas districts hap-
pened in the 2007 and 2009 elections. In 2013 and 2017, the party system underwent
radical changes due to the domination of the ruling party Movimiento Patria Altiva I
Soberana (MPAIS). For both election years, the effective number of legislative parties
was the lowest since the countries’ first elections in 1979. It reached the score of 1.83
effective parties in 2013, compared to a score of 7.54 in 2002 (Freidenberg & Pachano,
2016). Even if a majority of parties competed in the 2013 and 2017 elections in the over-
seas districts, a significant number of registered parties decided not to present candidates
in these districts.
What could therefore explain this low share of political parties participating in the
elections in the overseas district? In Section 2, we identified four main hypotheses that












Europe, Asia and Oceania 21.74% 18.03% 75.00% 62.50% 29.63%
Canada and the United States 26.09% 16.13% 68.75% 56.25% 29.45%
Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa 15.94% 10.17% 50.00% 68.75% 22.50%
All 21.28% 14.84% 64.58% 62.50% 27.22%
Note: The percentage consists in the number of parties competing in each overseas district divided by the total number of
parties.
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will be tested in our models. A set of independent variables is derived from each
hypothesis.
Given the instability of the Ecuadorian party system, our first independent variable
concerns patterns of party competition in previous elections. We expect that parties
would have incentives to participate in elections if competition is low. A first variable
concerns the effective number of political parties competing in the overseas district
(H1a) based on vote shares in the previous elections. Since 2007 marked the first legisla-
tive elections when Ecuadorians living abroad could vote, there is no prior point of com-
parison. As a proxy for party competition in these elections, we used the effective number
of parties in the first round of the 2006 presidential elections in each of the three overseas
districts. Electoral alliances are counted as one single party, independent from the
number of political organisations in the alliance. An average of 3.5 parties participated
in legislative elections in each overseas district.
MPAIS participated in all legislative elections in all overseas districts. The party
finished as the largest party in all three districts and its results varied between 33.7%
and 68.1% of the votes. Consequently, this dominant party won all seats in overseas dis-
tricts for all four legislative elections, with three exceptions: one seat in the Latin
America, Caribbean and Africa district in 2009 (which was won by the electoral alliance
of Partido Renovación Institucional Acción Nacional, PRIAN, together with the FEP
Movimiento Hermandad Ecuadoriana, MHE) and one seat in the same district and in
the Canada and United States district in 2017 (both seats taken by the Movimiento
Creando Oportunidades, CREO). We therefore included a variable measuring the party
vote shares of MPAIS in each overseas district in the previous legislative elections and
in the first round of the 2006 presidential elections as a proxy for party competition in
the 2007 legislative elections. The reasoning behind this variable is that the strength of
MPAIS may daunt other parties to participate in elections (H1b).
The second set of independent variables is derived from the previous electoral trajec-
tory of a political party in each overseas district in order to operationalise its electoral
experience. There are two main types of seats in the Ecuadorian Assembly: ‘national
seats’ that are elected based on a nationwide district and ‘district-based seats’ elected
based on a smaller territorial unit. Overseas districts belong to the second type of
seats, together with provincial and sub-provincial districts. As a result, Ecuadorians
living abroad – similar to other Ecuadorians voters – face two ballots for the unicameral
legislative elections in the voting booth: one for the national seats4 and the other for the
two district-based (overseas) seats. We thus included one variable that measures the par-
ticipation of the party in the previous elections in the overseas district for both district-
based and national seats. This variable takes the value of ‘0’ when the party did not par-
ticipate in the previous elections in the district, ‘1’ when it participated for one of the two
seat types or ‘2’when the party participated in both election types. As a proxy for the 2007
elections, we used party participation in the 2006 presidential elections.
The third set of explanatory variables concern the characteristics of the overseas dis-
tricts, particularly their size and distribution. Given the fact that they are based on geo-
graphical criteria, the three districts are unbalanced in demographic terms. Only 31,096
voters were registered in the Latin America, Caribbean and Africa district for the 2017
elections, while 236,637 voters were in the Europe, Asia and Oceania district in the
same year. That is about 7.5 times more voters. Size matters since it may be easier to
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win a seat in an electoral district composed of a small number of voters, as it facilitates the
campaign and individual contact with voters. We operationalise this district size variable
by measuring the natural logarithm of the number of registered voters per overseas dis-
trict (H3a). Overall, the number of registered Ecuadorian voters living abroad increased
over time (Figure 1).
But the impact of the size of the electoral district might be mitigated by the distri-
bution of voters within the district. Concerning overseas districts, voters can be spread
across a large number of countries or even continents. As we mentioned above, cam-
paigning costs increase for parties and candidates by the number of different countries
and territories involved. Our second variable regarding the overseas districts character-
istics concerns the number of countries composing each of the three Ecuadorian electoral
districts (H3b). It varies from two (in the Canada and the United States district) to 25
residence countries in 2013 for the voters in the Europe, Asia and Oceania district.
The number of residence countries slightly fluctuates over time, as more voters from
different countries tend to be integrated in the most recent legislative elections. As an
alternative way to measure the distribution of voters, our models also consider the
number of polling stations per overseas district. Both the number of countries and
number of polling stations are slightly correlated (r = 0.303).
Our fourth set of independent variables concerns party ideology. Data on Ecuadorian
parties are seldom found in comparative international datasets. The country is absent from
projects that aim at measuring party positions, such as theMARPOR-CMP-MRG project,
the Chapel Hill expert survey, and the Global Party Survey (Norris, 2020). Latin American
Political Parties (Alcántara, 2001) only include a handful of Ecuadorian parties.Moreover,
no official information exists on ideology of parties registered with the CNE and parties’
self-positioning is not a reliable measurement. In this article, we rely on the few analyses
of party positions in international projects and on secondary literature (e.g. Basabe-
Serrano, 2018; Moncagatta & Espinosa, 2019; Norris, 2020), as well as our own analysis
Figure 1. Number of registered voter per overseas district (2007–2017).
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of available partymanifestos to assess parties’ ideological positioning on the left-right scale
and on policies designed for emigrants. Our database contains many missing values for
party positions on migration, especially for older and smaller parties.
Concerning the variable measuring the importance of Ecuadorians living abroad for
party ideology, we coded a dummy variable and drew on our analysis of party manifestos
(H4a). We coded the variable as ‘1’ if the party manifesto paid attention to emigrants, emi-
gration policies or any emigrant-related issue; we indicated ‘0’ otherwise.5 Obviously, all
parties that were only registered for participating in one or more districts abroad allocated
themajority of theirmanifesto content to emigration. It is important tomention that, con-
trary to the normal procedures of comparative projects on party ideology, we are measur-
ing emigration instead of immigration. We relied on existing databases and secondary
literature to identity if the party or electoral coalition is left-, centre- or right-leaning
(H4b). This is a rather raw measure but the volatility of the Ecuadorian party system
and the fluctuating party positions on important socioeconomic and societal issues
render a more detailed positioning impossible on the left-right scale. In our database,
219 parties were coded as left-wing, 116 as centre parties, and 150 as right-wing.
We also integrated several control variables in our models. First, we added a dummy
variable for electoral alliances. Electoral alliances between two or more national and dis-
trict-based parties are frequent in Ecuador and significantly impact election results
(Dandoy, 2017, 2019). Alliances might ease the party strategies in presenting candidates
in overseas districts, along with the fact that they may affect the ideology of the alliance
both in terms of the importance of emigration issues and of left-right positioning. We
also added a dummy variable for the FEP that are registered to participate in elections
only in one of more overseas districts. 72 observations in our database correspond to
FEP. We finally control for voter turnout that might mitigate the impact of overseas dis-
trict size on the decision to participate in elections, and we integrated a dummy for the
first election year of 2007.6
Results
Given the structure of our data (parties are clustered in districts and in election years)
and the fact that the dependent variable is binary, we ran a series of multilevel mixed-
effects probit regressions. Table 2 displays the results of the model testing for the four
hypotheses, including control variables, for the total number of cases (N = 485). Our
models are statistically significant, given the p-value is less than 0.001. These models
allow us to appreciate the structure of constraints and incentives that party competition
generates within and outside Ecuador. Few variables are significant, and we must reject
two of our hypotheses. Nonetheless, we highlight relevant elements based on the
regression models.
Our models confirm the importance of party competition in explaining the party
decision to compete in an overseas electoral district (Hypothesis 1). We approached
party competition based on two different variables and both are negative and significant
in our models. Ecuadorian parties decide not to compete in an electoral district abroad
when the effective number of parties in previous elections in the same district is high.
Similarly, the dominance of MPAIS seems to function as a deterrence force, as parties
tend not to compete in overseas districts where MPAIS registered a large share of
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votes in previous elections in the same district. Both variables indicate that parties tend to
believe that their chances of obtaining one of the two seats in the overseas district is (too)
small and that it is better not to participate in these elections at all.7
The variable measuring previous electoral participation in the overseas districts –
whether in the ‘district-based seats’ and/or in the ‘national seats’ – has a significant
and positive impact on the parties’ decision to participate in elections in the overseas dis-
tricts, confirming Hypothesis 2. Owing to experience in the overseas districts, parties can
rely on existing tools, platforms and networks of voters that they had mobilised in pre-
vious elections. In that sense, there is path dependency regarding electoral participation,
independent from the success or defeat that such parties recorded. This decision to run
once again in overseas districts may also be triggered by the candidates themselves. If the
party can count on two serious and motivated candidates who already have campaign
experience and can guarantee a decent electoral result at a small cost, it seems logical
that a party decides to partake in these elections again.
But our variable of electoral experience in overseas districts concerns both types of
seats. We ran an alternative model where we disaggregated the previous electoral
Table 2. Explaining party presence in Ecuadorian overseas districts (2007–2017).
Model 1 Model 2
Without emigrant-related issues With emigrant-related issues
Party Competition −1.635*** −0.836*
(0.411) (0.459)
MPAIS vote shares −0.149*** −0.092
(0.054) (0.059)
Previous elections 0.811*** 0.472***
(0.113) (0.154)
District size 0.574 −0.088
(0.603) (0.703)
Number of countries 0.023 0.013
(0.021) (0.026)
Emigrant-related issues – 0.284
– (0.257)
Centre party −0.199 −0.074
(0.249) (0.354)

















Number of groups (Year) 4 4
Number of groups (District) 12 12
Log likelihood −211.413 −113.922
Wald chi2(11) 109.20 61.19
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Left-wing party as reference category.
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participation and distinguished between the two types of seats, i.e. the district-based and
national seats (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Results remain almost exactly the same
concerning the other independent variables (both variables of party competition and
the 2007 election dummy remain significant) and indicate that both previous experiences
in presenting candidates for the ‘district-based seats’ and in the ‘national seats’ in a given
overseas district positively impact the decision to participate in the elections in the dis-
trict. Finally, the dummy variable for the year of the first overseas elections is significant
and negative, indicating that parties were in general cautious to participate in elections
abroad. The other control variables (including turnout, alliances and FEP) do not
produce significant effects in our models.
We have to reject Hypotheses 3 (district characteristics) and 4 (party ideology). Dis-
trict size, based on the number of registered voters, is not significantly related with party
presence in overseas districts. The same holds true regarding the amount of residence
countries, viewed as a measure of the distribution of voters across the district. We ran
alternative models (see Table A1 in the Appendix) where we used the number of
polling stations rather than the number of countries as a proxy of voter distribution.
Overall, results regarding the impact of party competition and previous electoral experi-
ence remain the same, even when the variable measuring the number of voters in the dis-
trict is positive and significant. The hypothesis regarding the left-right position of parties
has to be rejected, as it does not seem that the decision to participate in elections in over-
seas districts is guided by party ideology. We also ran some alternative models using left-
and right-wing party dummies (not shown) but results remain the same.
Concerning the importance of issues related to Ecuadorians living abroad in party
ideology (measured as the saliency of migration issues in party manifestos), we ran a
model that includes only a fraction of the Ecuadorian parties based on available data
(N = 219). There is a strong bias in these analyses since we could not find relevant infor-
mation and party documents for smaller parties and for older elections and FEP are over-
represented in this subset of data. Yet, results in Model 2 (see Table 2) confirm previous
results and indicate that Ecuadorian parties are more likely to participate in overseas elec-
tions when party competition is low and when parties have prior electoral experience in
the overseas district. In these models, the control variable of FEP is significant. Even if
this database relies on a biased sample of parties in our database, it clearly indicates
that the importance of emigrant-related issues in party ideology does not explain why
some Ecuadorian parties decide to compete in overseas districts while others do not.
Conclusion
This article aimed at understanding why some political parties refrain from participating
in elections in some districts, while presenting candidates in others. Rather than looking
at the subnational dynamics of electoral participation, we examined the strategic entry of
political parties in overseas districts. Based on the Ecuadorian case, this study investi-
gated parties’ decisions to compete (or not) in at least one of the country’s three overseas
districts since 2007. The importance of overseas voting, the instability of the Ecuadorian
party system and its plethora of parties and political organisations increase the intrigue of
this case study. Even if it seems to be easier to participate in overseas than in national
districts, given the smaller number of registered voters, the majority of Ecuadorian
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parties decided not to participate in elections in these districts, contradicting the vote-
seeking orientation of parties (Strøm, 1990).
Employing a quantitative analysis of all national and full emigrant parties (FEP), we
demonstrated that parties with previous electoral experience in an overseas district are
more likely to run for elections in the same district in the future. Similarly, the patterns
of party competition in each overseas district also influence this decision: parties present
candidates in districts where the number of competing parties is low and where the
dominant party may proportionally obtain fewer votes. But the main findings of this
article are revealed in the variables that do not impact the parties’ decisions. The overseas
district’s characteristics and party ideologies do not impact the parties’ decisions to
compete in elections in overseas districts. It is quite surprising to observe that the
decision is unaffected by the easiness to win a seat (for instance, in districts with fewer
voters). Similarly, party ideology (a left or right position, or pro-migrant stances) does
not affect the strategic decision and FEP – which are, by definition, more interested in
emigrant-related issues – are not more likely either to compete in overseas districts
than other parties. In sum, the decision of political parties to campaign abroad is
based on a cost–benefit estimation rather than an ideational approach.
Drawing on the Ecuadorian case, which is influential to evaluate transnational party
competition (Pedroza & Palop-García, 2017), we contribute to the existing literature in
multiple ways. We created an inferential model, suitable for replication for a comparative
perspective, of what Gamlen (2015) coined as the ‘feedback effect’. Simply put, we opera-
tionalised the consequence of external voting rights as the strategic entry of political parties
in overseas districts. In contrast, Gamlen (2015) examined the ‘perceived importance’ of
overseas votes for parties in a country that counts the vote in the previous home district
of non-resident citizens and that has incomplete information regarding emigrant voter
turnout over time. We therefore provided empirical evidence on the increasingly impor-
tant dynamic between emigration and homeland politics.We not only overcame the scho-
larly bias in studying elections predominantly at the national level, but also suggested
another way to indirectly assessmigrants’ political engagementwith their origin countries.
While this article helps us to understand party strategies in elections abroad, we
should still envisage FEP that are by definition more interested in competing in overseas
districts, as compared to other parties. Furthermore, our explanatory models would
benefit from a systematic comparison (e.g. most-similar cases strategy) in future
studies. For instance, Italy is similar to Ecuador in terms of (transnational) political com-
petition: one overseas district but with four divisions (ripartizioni), coupled with a rela-
tively high party fragmentation, proportional representation, several emigrant seats, the
possibility to create FEP, and district-based competition.
Further studies should also consider adding new independent variables to the models
to unpack the electoral connection between citizens living abroad and political parties. It
can affect the calculus of voting and swing election results, as occurred in the 2006 Italian
parliamentary election (Lafleur, 2013). The drivers for emigration might prove to be an
important trigger when overseas voters decide to vote (Boccagni & Ramírez, 2013).
Although on most occasions the reasons to emigrate are not singular, one may classify
such motivations into the domains of economic, environmental, sociocultural and pol-
itical circumstances. Non-resident citizens might not vote for a party or candidate of
REPRESENTATION 13
their origin country that is discursively responsible for their emigration (Paarlberg, 2020;
Umpierrez de Reguero & Dandoy, 2020).
Moreover, transnational party competition can also be measured by employing
surveys and interviews, meaning a methodological shift from the aggregate-level to an
explanation relying on individual units. In this way, scholars can delve in transnational
party membership and activism, as well as partisanship. Indeed, they can more compre-
hensively sustain the abroad-inland nexus and explore the relevance of political dis-
courses in multilevel arenas of competition.
Given the upcoming general elections in Ecuador in the first trimester of 2021, we
cannot miss this opportunity to encourage new analyses controlling for MPAIS’ pres-
ence. As indicated, MPAIS was the dominant party over this last decade, causing a note-
worthy drop in the index of party fragmentation within and outside the country. Since
MPAIS was divided into two party organisations as a result of the public split between
Lenín Moreno and Rafael Correa in 2017–2018, MPAIS’ image has worsened as com-
pared to other political parties. We expect this context will affect Ecuadorian party com-
petition in the near future.
Notes
1. As of 2020, some countries that have created overseas districts to organise external voting
rights but they still comprise a marginal group; however, parliamentary debates across
countries and cross-national data suggest that this policy is increasing globally. To the
best of our knowledge, only Cook Islands, France, Morocco and Portugal implemented it
prior to the 1990s. Now voting abroad in overseas districts occurs for Algeria, Cape
Verde, Colombia, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Italy, Niger, North
Macedonia, Mozambique, Portugal, Romania, Senegal and Tunisia (Collyer, 2014b;
Palop-García, 2018; Umpierrez de Reguero, Dandoy, & Palma, 2017).
2. A system of extraterritorial voting casted externally (outside the origin country) and
counted in overseas districts by the homeland authorities.
3. In the 2007 election, Ecuadorian authorities used a simple majority and d’Hondt system to
convert overseas votes into seats. The seat allocation methods were d’Hondt and Webster
from 2009 onwards in overseas districts. There have been small changes in the number of
polling stations and the number of countries of residence where nonresident Ecuadorians
could vote.
4. The number of national seats varies across elections, from 24 in 2007 to 15 in the 2017
elections.
5. As we could not access to most of the manifestos for the 2017 elections, we attributed to
these missing manifestos the values that we coded for the 2019 elections.
6. We did not control for incumbency, as the variable does not vary: all incumbent parties par-
ticipate in the next election in all overseas districts.
7. We also tested whether the electoral success of full emigrant parties (measured by their
cumulative party vote shares in previous elections in each overseas district) had an
impact on parties’ strategic entry in these districts but this variable was not significant
and had no impact on the models, so we do not show it here.
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Appendix
Table A1. Explaining party presence in Ecuadorian overseas districts (alternative models).
Model 3 Model 4
Party Competition −1.643*** −1.233***
(0.411) (0.431)
MPAIS vote shares −0.150*** −0.091
(0.054) (0.057)
Previous elections – 0.808***
– (0.113)
Previous elections (district-based seat) 0.736*** –
(0.215) –
Previous elections (national seat) 0.867*** –
(0.179) –
Size district 0.571 2.631**
(0.603) (1.231)
Number of countries 0.0231 –
(0.0214) –
Number of polling stations – −0.003
– (0.002)
Centre party −0.194 −0.182
(0.250) (0.249)
Left-wing party 0.033 0.036
(0.165) (0.165)
Electoral alliance −0.034 −0.022
(0.186) (0.186)













Number of groups (Year) 4 4
Number of groups (District) 12 12
Log likelihood −211.330 −211.209
Wald chi2(11) 109.58 109.64
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Left-wing party as reference category.
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